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INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to participate in the 2019 Kansas Law Review 
Symposium, “Antitrust Law and Policy in the 21st Century.”  Antitrust is 
once again a hot topic and discussion about how to effectively enforce the 
laws in a digital age is generating widespread attention.  My focus will be 
on the topic of promoting fundamental due process in competition law 
investigation and enforcement.  With competition authorities around the 
globe becoming increasingly more active, it is one of the most important 
topics on the antitrust agenda.  And this year, we witnessed a watershed 
moment with the adoption of a new framework protecting due process. 
The International Competition Network (ICN) unveiled the 
Framework on Competition Agency Procedures (CAP) in May 2019 to 
promote fundamental due process in competition investigation.1  As of 
August 2019, there were seventy-two signatories to the CAP, reflecting 
almost every leading competition authority.2  It was the first time in history 
that competition authorities from around the world entered into a 
multilateral framework on due process that included core due process 
protections and meaningful review mechanisms.  It was, as United States 
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim noted, “a remarkable and 
historic achievement for antitrust enforcement” that combines “strong 
substantive principles with meaningful review mechanisms” that “goes 
well beyond anything competition agencies have ever done before.”3 
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 1. INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN FRAMEWORK ON COMPETITION AGENCY PROCEDURES 
1 (2019), https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICN_CAP 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG9G-TJFD] [hereinafter CAP FRAMEWORK]. 
 2. See ICN CAP Participants, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/CAPparticipants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/63NY-283J] (listing ICN CAP participants as of August 2019).   
 3. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New Multilateral Framework on Procedures Approved 
by the International Competition Network (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new 
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As discussed elsewhere,4 the CAP includes commitments with respect 
to fundamental due process protections, including nondiscrimination, 
transparency, timely notice, meaningful engagement, timely resolution, 
confidentiality protections, avoidance of conflicts of interest, access to 
information, opportunity to defend, access to counsel, attorney-client 
privilege, written decisions, and judicial review.5 
Although not a legally binding treaty, each competition authority that 
is a participant to the CAP “agrees that it intends, in good faith, to adhere 
to th[e] Framework to the extent consistent with applicable laws.”6  This 
commitment is consistent with the general requirement under international 
law that “[e]very treaty . . . must be performed by [parties] in good faith,”7 
but only to the extent that doing so comports with applicable domestic law.  
In essence, the CAP is a soft-law instrument that recognizes procedural 
norms that reflect international minimum standards. 
Given the nonbinding nature of the CAP, the critical questions are, 
why should competition authorities comply with the CAP and how will 
they be held accountable for a failure to comply?  This article summarizes 
the compliance incentives that will induce competition authorities to honor 
the terms of the framework.  It is based on my work as Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, 
working directly with Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim and 
the career attorneys at the Department of Justice in negotiating the 
framework with dozens of other competition authorities.8 
This article begins with a general discussion of why governments 
comply with international law norms.  It then discusses the specific 
antitrust context in which international norms are created, the process of 
identifying fundamental due process norms, and the review mechanisms 
that were adopted to promote meaningful compliance with the CAP. 
I. COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
Before addressing the specific context of the incentives for 
competition authorities to comply with fundamental due process norms, it 




 4. Makan Delrahim & Roger P. Alford, Promoting Fundamental Due Process in Competition 
Law Enforcement (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 5.  CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 4–7. 
 6. Id. at 2.  
 7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 8. For a more detailed account of the negotiations of the CAP, see Delrahim & Alford, supra 
note 4. 
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international law norms.  There are a variety of responses to this question, 
but the short answer is that there is no one reason that government actors 
comply, and the incentive to comply will differ based on the context and 
nature of the norms. 
The most obvious answer to the question of compliance is that 
governments respect international norms to avoid sanction, punishment, 
or retaliation.  Examples of such coercive measures are acts of self-defense 
in response to an armed attack,9 collective security against the unlawful 
use of force,10 raising tariffs in response to trade violations,11 and 
foreclosing access to a market for intellectual property violations.12  The 
threat or use of sanctions are powerful tools to induce compliance with 
international norms.  But such measures are only available in certain 
contexts where a credible threat of sanction is possible.  Typically, 
coercion will only be applied where there is a power imbalance in the 
relationship among states and there is a sufficiently strong interest of more 
powerful states to apply coercive action to induce weaker states to comply 
with an international norm.13 
A second reason that governments comply with international norms is 
to induce reciprocal behavior from other governments.  One party to an 
international agreement may comply with obligations that confer benefits 
to another party with the expectation that the benefitted party will comply 
in a reciprocal manner.14  Reciprocity confers benefits in a variety of 
contexts, including diplomatic relations,15 reciprocal trade benefits,16 and 
the recognition of foreign judgments or arbitral awards.17  Indeed, it is a 
core principle of treaty observance that a “material breach of a bilateral 
treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a 
ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or 
 
 9. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 10. See id. art. 42. 
 11. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22 ¶ 
1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 (describing the circumstances under which a member may suspend concessions or other 
obligations). 
 12. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2012). 
 13. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28–29 (2005). 
 14. See generally Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 93, 93–94 (2003) (discussing the importance of reciprocity in international law 
“because there is no overarching legal authority with compulsory jurisdiction to enforce agreements”). 
 15. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocols art. 47, Apr. 18, 1961, 
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
 16. See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351–1354 (2012).  
 17. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227–28 (1895) (discussing the role of reciprocity in 
determining whether to give foreign judgments conclusive effect or to view them as “prima facie 
evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff’s claim”); New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. I(3), June 10, 1958, 21.3 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 4. 
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in part.”18  As former International Court of Justice Judge Bruno Simma 
put it, “it is the reciprocal interest in the observance of certain rules . . . 
that supplies an obvious, if not the principal, reason why international law 
somehow manages to accomplish its tasks, despite the absence of most 
institutional features considered indispensable by domestic lawyers.”19 
A third reason for compliance with international norms is to promote 
or maintain a government’s reputation.  The decision to respect 
international norms enhances a government’s reputation, while the 
decision to reject an international norm detracts from its reputation.20  In 
particular, in the multilateral context such as international organizations, 
where governments interact on a regular basis, there are major reputational 
payoffs for compliance, frequent opportunities to assess compliance, and 
a credible basis to anticipate likely future compliance.  As Andrew 
Guzman has noted, “the reputational consequences of a violation will be 
more severe in a multilateral context—because the reputational 
information spreads quickly to more countries.”21  The relative standing of 
government actors within an international network will change over time, 
and the desire to maintain and enhance one’s standing will tend to induce 
norm compliance. 
A fourth reason for government compliance is because the 
international norms already are consistent with domestic norms or are 
readily susceptible to becoming internalized within the domestic system.  
“General principles of law” are a fundamental source of international law22  
which typically find their origin in domestic legal systems.23  But the 
reverse can also happen, with international norms becoming internalized 
domestically in a variety of ways, including acceptance by the broader 
public, adherence by political actors, or adoption by the legal system.24  
Often this process of internalization is straightforward because 
 
 18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 19. 10 MPEPIL Reciprocity § 605 (2012). 
 20. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
73, 75 (2008) (“[R]eputational payoff from compliance will be larger than the reputational payoff from 
violation.”).   
 21. Id. at 72.  
 22. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c) (“The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”).   
 23. Michelle Biddulph & Dwight Newman, A Contextualized Account of General Principles of 
International Law, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 286, 298–99 (2014) (citing scholars such as A.D. McNair, 
Hersch Lauterpacht, Campbell McLachlan, and David Bederman in support of the view that “general 
principles of law are only those that can be identified in domestic legal systems and transposed to the 
international sphere”).  
 24. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 642–55 (1998) (describing the process of domestic internalization). 
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international norms are broadly consistent with domestic norms and state 
interests, such that it is difficult to assess whether the process is one of 
alignment rather than internalization.25  Sometimes domestic norms, such 
as strong environmental protections, are exported by powerful 
governments onto the international plane with the hope or expectation that 
once they have achieved the status of international norms they will be 
internalized by other governments.26  These variations have a common 
theme of a fluid process of negotiation and dialogue between domestic 
norms and international norms, with each having the potential to influence 
the other. 
Finally, a fifth reason government actors comply with an international 
norm is because they perceive the norm in question, and process by which 
it was made, to be fair and legitimate.  A norm perceived to be legitimate 
promotes voluntary compliance by state actors, which, in the international 
context, is critical because of the paucity of other modes of compulsion.27  
For an international norm to be perceived as legitimate pursuant to this 
process-based approach, there must be a community of government actors 
who have created a corpus of rules which the actors deem to be legitimate, 
and an agreed process that “legitimates the exercise of authority.”28  
Government actors are more likely to voluntarily comply with an 
international norm if they perceive that the norm is clear and specific,29 
the process of rulemaking is valid and authoritative,30 the norm is applied 
consistently and coherently,31 and the norm is “supported by the 
procedural and institutional framework within which the community [of 
government actors] organizes itself.”32 
II. COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT NETWORK 
Unlike other areas of law, it is not obvious how international norms 
are created in the antitrust context.  There are no binding treaties or 
agreements, so the common practice of competition authorities is often the 
best indicator of prevailing norms.  Likewise, in the antitrust context, there 
is no international organization similar to a treaty body that imposes rules 
 
 25. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13, at 104–06. 
 26. See, e.g., Miranda A. Schreurs, Domestic Institutions and International Environmental 
Agendas in Japan and Germany, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
134–158 (Miranda A. Schreurs & Elizabeth C. Economy eds., 1997). 
 27. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 25–26 (1995). 
 28. Id. at 12. 
 29. See id. at 30–34 (describing this indicator of legitimacy as “determinacy”). 
 30. See id. at 34–38 (describing this indicator of legitimacy as “symbolic validation”). 
 31. See id. at 38–41 (describing this indicator of legitimacy as “coherence”).  
 32. Id. at 41; see id. at 42–46 (describing this indicator of legitimacy as “adherence”).  
1170 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
on government enforcement behavior.33  Unlike the World Trade 
Organization, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, or similar treaties, there are no 
substantive or procedural rules of antitrust law enforcement that every 
Member State is obligated to respect.  Nonetheless, competition law 
enforcers are a distinct epistemic community34 that interacts with one 
another on a regular basis and has established routines and practices 
regarding the coordination of their enforcement behavior. 
The primary organizations that facilitate coordination and 
convergence in competition enforcement are the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Competition 
Committee35 and the ICN.36  Founded in 1961, the OECD is composed of 
thirty-six of the leading competition authorities in the world.37  The 
competition authorities of OECD members meet regularly, often with 
authorities from nonmembers, to promote best practices in competition 
policy and practice.38  One of the core functions of the OECD Competition 
Committee is to provide a forum for government actors to articulate their 
position on the relevant competition issues of the day, a process that 
promotes best practices among other competition authorities and enhances 
the emergence of norms of proper behavior.39  Among the most notable 
achievements of the committee in recent decades is the “increase in the 
number of countries enforcing competition law, the convergence across 
jurisdictions of substantive ideas on competition law enforcement, and 
 
 33. See, e.g., Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition Network: 
Its Past, Current and Future Role, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK AT TEN: ORIGINS, 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ASPIRATIONS 61 (Paul Lugard ed., 2011) (describing ICN’s work product as 
nonbinding). 
 34. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 
46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (“An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain . . . .”). 
 35. International Co-operation in Competition, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/competition 
/internationalco-operationandcompetition.htm [https://perma.cc/V9CT-6DZD] (last visited Mar. 31, 
2020). 
 36. About, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org 
/about/ [https://perma.cc/V8LY-9XQM] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter About ICN]. 
 37. History, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about/history/#d.en.194377 [https://perma.cc/RWV8 
-RYFV] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020). 
 38. Best Practice Roundtables on Competition Policy, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/daf 
/competition/roundtables.htm [https://perma.cc/627C-PTDA] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter 
Best Practice Roundtables]; see also Participation of UNCTAD at Best Practice Roundtables 
Organized by the OECD Competition Committee, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (Dec. 2–4, 
2019), https://unctad.org/en/pages/MeetingDetails.aspx?meetingid=2336 [https://perma.cc/RPN3 
-KM9V] (noting that Best Practice Roundtables are held twice a year).   
 39. Best Practice Roundtables, supra note 38.   
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increased cooperation among competition authorities.”40 
The ICN was founded in 2001 as a global body devoted to providing 
a forum for competition authorities to address practical competition 
concerns.41  It has grown from 14 jurisdictions in 2001 to approximately 
140 jurisdictions today.42  The “ICN’s paramount goal is to facilitate 
convergence on superior approaches concerning the substance, procedure, 
and administration of competition law.”43  It pursues that goal through 
regular annual meetings among all competition authorities that build 
consensus, promote best practices, and facilitate convergence on substance 
and procedures.44  Because the ICN is an informal network that is open for 
membership to all competition authorities,45 there are ample opportunities 
for smaller and newer agencies to host events and serve in leadership roles 
and enhance their reputation within the competition community of 
enforcers. 
These two organizations provide the context for government actors to 
identify, promote, and enforce international norms.  Applying the reasons 
outlined in Part I for why governments comply with international norms, 
one can assess the possible motivations for competition authorities to 
apply fundamental due process norms.  The first two reasons—sanction 
and reciprocity—are unlikely to be factors motivating compliance.  It 
would be highly unusual for competition authorities to face sanction or 
coercion as a credible means to enforce compliance with due process 
commitments.  In addition, reciprocity is unlikely to be the reason that 
competition authorities comply with procedural norms.  For example, the 
Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice will not alter its due 
process commitments toward parties appearing before it based on the 
treatment that American nationals receive by a competition authority in 
another country. 
The ICN and the OECD do, however, promote the other three reasons 
for compliance with international norms.  Both organizations provide 
ample opportunities for competition authorities to promote their 
reputations.  These organizations provide leadership opportunities, group 
 
 40. Krisztian Katona, Interview with Frédéric Jenny, Chairman of OECD Competition 
Committee, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2018, at 1, 2. 
 41. About ICN, supra note 36.  
 42. Id.; see also Members, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, https://www.internationalcompetition 
network.org/members/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4ZKA-4R2G]. 
 43. Hollman & Kovacic, supra note 33, at 52.  
 44. Id. at 57–58 (describing ICN’s method for promoting superior practice standards among 
members). 
 45. Id. at 74–75 (“Compared to its main international counterparts, ICN relies more heavily upon 
the contributions of [nongovernment advisors] from academia, the business community, consumer 
groups, and the private bar.”); see also About ICN, supra note 36. 
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identification, expectations of proper enforcement behavior, and 
articulation of substantive and procedural norms.  They also typically 
reflect the positions of leading competition authorities, such that the norms 
common with those authorities often are promoted for adoption by the 
other competition authorities.  The process of exportation by leading 
authorities, adoption at the international plane, and internalization 
elsewhere is a common phenomenon with these organizations.  Finally, 
with both the OECD and the ICN there is an accepted process for adopting 
guidelines, best practices, and recommendations, enhancing the legitimacy 
of norms that are formalized through these organization’s processes.46  To 
the extent the norms are promoted within the context of these 
organizations, the likelihood of adherence is enhanced.  Thus, although 
these international norms promulgated by these organizations are not 
binding, for a variety of reasons competition authorities will tend to follow 
them. 
In introducing the initiative on June 1, 2018, Assistant Attorney 
General Makan Delrahim placed special emphasis on the reputational 
impact of compliance.47  As Delrahim noted, “[t]he rich network of 
relationships ensures that reputation matters, and that the promise to abide 
by an obligation becomes a potent means of enhancing compliance.”48  He 
also noted that while guidelines and recommendations promulgated by 
international organizations are valuable, “[p]romises are different, because 
they create the opportunity for reflecting on decisions that may help 
enhance reputational standings among peers.  This is true for both hard-
law commitments such as treaties, and soft-law commitments such as 
MOUs.”49  Thus, even though the framework was nonbinding, the promise 
to abide by the commitments creates a reputational incentive to comply. 
III. IDENTIFYING FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS NORMS 
The decision to negotiate a framework for fundamental due process 
raised a critical question of identifying which norms should be included as 
fundamental.  Fortunately, a series of guidelines, best practices, 
 
 46. See, e.g., INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS 1 (2015), https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2019/05/RPs-Investigative-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HM6-KS7M]; ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. COMPETITION COMM., PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND TRANSPARENCY 5 
(2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/mergers/50235955.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HU9-TTD3]. 
 47. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Fresh Thinking 
on Procedural Fairness: A Multilateral Framework on Procedures in Antitrust Enforcement (June 1, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1067582/download [https://perma.cc/N9HK-Z3YA]. 
 48. Id. at 4. 
 49. Id. (citations omitted). 
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recommendations, and similar documents promoting procedural 
convergence had been adopted over the previous decade.50  By comparing 
the content of all of these documents one could distill a core set of norms 
for possible inclusion in the framework.  The first draft of what became 
the CAP, known as the Washington Draft, was based on a survey of the 
work of the OECD and ICN, the competition chapters in free trade 
agreements, and recommendations from various bar organizations, such as 
the American Bar Association.51 
The other way to identify fundamental due process norms was to 
present the Washington Draft to leading competition authorities from 
around the world for discussion and negotiation.  This process of 
negotiation would start from the premise that if the leading authorities 
were all following certain procedural norms, then these norms were likely 
to be viewed as international minimum standards.  In other words, actual 
practice by leading enforcement agencies was one of the best indicators of 
what fundamental due process required. 
A number of agencies participated in the initial round of negotiations.  
These agencies were regionally diverse, representing civil and common 
law jurisdictions that utilized both administrative and prosecutorial 
systems.  This group included both large and established agencies as well 
as smaller and younger agencies.52  The initial group of agencies that the 
U.S. Department of Justice invited to participate in the negotiations 
included the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Brazil’s 
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, the Canadian 
Competition Bureau, Chile’s Fiscalía Nacional Económica, the 
Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission, the 
Japan Fair Trade Commission, Mexico’s Comisión Federal de 
Competencia Económica, New Zealand’s Commerce Commission, the 
Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore, the United 
Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority, and the United States 
Federal Trade Commission.53  The second draft, known as the Paris Draft, 
modified the previous draft to incorporate the practices of the core group 
 
 50. See, e.g., ICN RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, supra note 46, at 1; 
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INT’L TASK FORCE, BEST PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST 
PROCEDURE 1 (2015), https://www.regeringen.se/4b013e/contentassets/fc05f4222757489ba0b7110 
ae2f98144/american-bar-association-aba-section-of-antitrust-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XHJ-U3K3]; 
INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION AND 
REVIEW PROCEDURES (2018), https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2018/09/MWG_NPRecPractices2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN55-MNBT]; PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
AND TRANSPARENCY, supra note 46, at 5. 
 51. Delrahim & Alford, supra note 4, at 103–04. 
 52. Id. at 105. 
 53. Id. 
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of competition authorities.54 
The third tool for identifying fundamental due process was presenting 
the Paris Draft to every competition authority for comment.55  The 
negotiations began with a core group then expanded to every interested 
competititon authority.  This processs helped the negotiators confirm the 
content of fundamental due process norms and muted concerns that the 
negotations did not represent the full variety of experiences.  Over three 
dozen competition authorities met in New York in September 2018, and 
the U.S. Department of Justice received comments from dozens of 
agencies.56  Thus, the third draft, known as the New York Draft, reflected 
the input of every interested competition authority in the world.  This 
inclusive process gave significant credibility to the international norms 
that were included in the framework. 
The final tool for identifying the fundamental due process norms in 
competition enforcement was having the ICN adopt the norms as part of 
its organizational process.  There was significant discussion during the 
negotiations as to whether the framework should be implemented within 
the ICN rather than as a stand-alone arrangement.  Most participants 
preferred negotiating the final draft within the ICN.57  After several months 
of negotiation with every ICN member, in April 2019 the German 
Bundeskartellamt presented the final draft of the CAP to the ICN Steering 
Group.58  The fact that the CAP was unanimously supported by the ICN 
Steering Group provided institutional credibility to the international 
norms, ensuring that it would secure widespread support.  The CAP was 
opened for signature at the ICN annual meeting in Colombia in May 2019, 
and within the first few weeks received the support of over seventy 
competition authorities.59 
The process that led to the adoption of the CAP reflected a growing 
consensus that a core set of fundamental due process norms could secure 
the support of competition authorities around the world.  By surveying 
previous efforts to identify best practices, negotiating with a core group of 
highly respected competition authorities, opening the negotiations to every 
competition authority for their input, and then adopting the framework 
under the auspices of the ICN, the process of negotiation identified and 
crystallized the content of fundamental process norms in competition 
investigations and enforcement. 
 
 54. Id. at 105–06. 
 55. Id. at 108. 
 56. Id. at 108–09. 
 57. Id. at 109.  
 58. Id. at 114. 
 59. Id. at 116.  
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The norms adopted in the framework include the following: 
nondiscrimination, transparency, predictability, proper notice, meaningful 
and timely engagement, timely resolution, confidentiality, impartiality, 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, opportunity to defend, access to counsel, 
protection of privileged information, written decisions, public access to 
decisions, and judicial review.60 
IV. NEGOTIATING REVIEW MECHANISMS 
Beyond identifying the content of fundamental due process norms, the 
other key objective was to negotiate compliance mechanisms.  Without 
proper mechanisms to promote meaningful compliance, there were 
legitimate concerns that some participants to the framework may not 
adhere to their commitments.61  On the other hand, if the review 
mechanisms were too burdensome, there were genuine concerns that the 
framework would not receive widespread adherence.62  As with any 
agreement, negotiating the CAP required striking the appropriate balance 
between a strong agreement with few adherents and a weak agreement 
with many adherents.  In order to improve the status quo, the framework 
negotiators pursued a path of a nonbinding framework that included a core 
set of international minimum standards, combined with meaningful review 
mechanisms. 
International agreements frequently include provisions to promote 
compliance and resolve disputes.63  Those provisions fall along a 
continuum from soft diplomacy to binding adjudication.64  In between 
those extremes are a variety of review mechanisms that promote 
meaningful compliance without significant loss of sovereignty.65 
Many treaties do not include any provision for dispute settlement 
beyond general commitments to negotiate or consult.66  United States 
extradition treaties often include such language, providing that “[t]he 
 
 60. CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 4–7. 
 61. Delrahim & Alford, supra note 4, at 106–08. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 409, 418 
(2000) (discussing how rules are regarded as obligatory and how there are accepted procedures and 
remedies for a breach of the commitments). 
 64. See id. at 403, 418 (“[M]any international commitments that to a lawyer entail binding legal 
obligations lack significant levels of precision or delegation and are thus partial or soft under our 
definition.”).  
 65. See id. at 407–08 (discussing the Montreal Protocol and noting that “the regime has developed 
a ‘system for implementation review,’ with a noncompliance procedure that still falls short of third-
party dispute resolution but appears to have had some impact on behavior”). 
 66. See id. at 414 (“Numerous agreements call on states to ‘negotiate’ or ‘consult,’ without 
specifying particular procedures.”). 
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Parties may consult with each other in connection with the processing of 
individual cases and in furtherance of efficient implementation of this 
Treaty.”67  Likewise, competition chapters in free trade agreements may 
include a commitment to enter into consultations regarding due process 
commitments.68 
Other treaties address the settlement of disputes through a 
commitment to third-party mediation.  Under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, as well as the subsequent 
Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the parties shall seek to resolve their 
disputes through negotiation, or failing that, through a conciliation 
commission.69  These treaties also include an optional provision for 
binding litigation or arbitration.70 
Some treaties create a mechanism that authorizes private parties to 
present their case to their government agency for resolution with their 
counterpart agencies in other states.  For example, dual taxation treaties 
guarantee nondiscriminatory enforcement of tax laws, and authorizes 
persons allegedly harmed by a violation of such a commitment to present 
their case to their own government’s tax authority, which shall endeavor 
to resolve the dispute with the tax authority of the other contracting party.71 
Beyond these informal mechanisms to resolve disputes and review 
compliance, some treaties go further and have formal monitoring and 
review mechanisms.  Human rights treaties often take this approach.  For 
example, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
establishes an obligation on states to report their compliance with the 
 
 67. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, U.K.-U.S., art. 21, Mar. 31, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 07-426.  
 68. United States – Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 16.7, June 30, 2007, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Countries%20Regions/africa/agreements/pdfs/FTAs/South
%20Korea%20FULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/93CN-ZN7D]. 
 69. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 14, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]; Paris Agreement to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 24, Dec. 13, 2015, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, annex (2016) [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. 
 70. UNFCCC, supra note 69, art. 14; Paris Agreement, supra note 69, art. 24. 
 71. See, e.g., Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital 
Gains, U.K.-U.S., art. 26, July 24, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13161.  The Convention describes the process 
of achieving dispute resolution through a government agency: 
Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the Contracting States result or 
will result for him in taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, he 
may . . . present his case to the competent authority of the Contracting State of which he is 
a resident or national. . . .  The competent authority shall endeavour, if the objection 
appears to it to be justified . . . to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent 
authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance of taxation which is 
not in accordance with this Convention.  
Id.   
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treaty and also a committee of experts to review compliance and make 
suggestions and recommendations based on their examination of state 
reports.72  The treaty includes an optional protocol in which states may 
authorize the committee to receive and consider communications from 
individuals who claim to be victims of that state’s treaty violation.73 
Other agreements do not create a committee of experts; instead, they 
call for periodic assessment reports by treaty signatories.  The Hague 
Adoption Convention, for example, provides that “[t]he Secretary General 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law shall at regular 
intervals convene a Special Commission in order to review the practical 
operation of the Convention.”74  Approximately every five years, the 
signatories to the Hague Adoption Convention participate in the Special 
Commission and approve conclusions and recommendations.75 
Finally, numerous international agreements provide for binding 
dispute settlement.  Some treaties create a private right of action that 
authorizes private parties to pursue arbitration against state parties alleged 
to have violated a due process treaty obligation.  This is common in the 
investment treaty context.  For example, the bilateral investment treaty 
between the United States and Argentina76 has given rise to almost two 
dozen cases in which United States private parties have filed investment 
arbitration disputes against Argentina.77  Provisions for binding dispute 
resolution are also common in the human rights context, and, in Europe, 
may protect due process guarantees in the competition law context.78 
 
 72. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities arts. 34–39, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 73. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 1, Dec. 
13, 2006, 2518 U.N.T.S. 296. 
 74. Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption 
art. 42, May 29, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-51 (1992), 1870 U.N.T.S. 167. 
 75. See generally Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions and 
Recommendations Adopted by the Fourth Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical 
Operation of the 1993 Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention, at 1 (June 8–12, 2015), 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/858dd0aa-125b-4063-95f9-4e9b4afd3719.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU8W 
-6BUR] [hereinafter Hague Special Commission Recommendations]. 
 76. Treaty Between United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the 
Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 103-2. 
 77. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, Argentina, INV. POL’Y HUB, https://investment 
policy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/8/argentina [https://perma.cc/2DSW 
-9HFM] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (listing twenty-one investment disputes United States private 
parties have filed against Argentina through July 31, 2019). 
 78. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, 
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005 (providing a right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal); see also Tamar 
Khuchua, Corporate Human Rights Protection in EU Competition Law Enforcement: The Standard of 
Protection of Companies’ Rights in the Light of ECHR 19 (May 2016) (unpublished Master thesis, 
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Also common are agreements that include binding dispute settlement 
commitments directly between the contracting parties.  For example, the 
United States has Open Skies Agreements with over 120 countries that 
include provisions for consultation and binding arbitration.79  Numerous 
treaties confer jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice to interpret 
the treaty and resolve disputes between the contracting parties.80 
Given the wide range of options available to promote compliance, the 
CAP negotiators discussed at some length which mechanisms were likely 
to promote compliance but not unduly encroach on sovereignty.81  At the 
far end of the spectrum the options of binding arbitration or litigation were 
rejected.82  Given that the CAP was a nonbinding framework, it would 
have been inconsistent with the nature of the agreement to impose a 
binding dispute settlement mechanism.  Establishing a commission of 
experts also was not on the table, because it appeared unlikely that many 
competition authorities would commit to such an arrangement. 
From the initial draft, the Antitrust Division sought to balance the need 
for meaningful review with the desire to secure widespread support for the 
agreement; therefore, the options that the negotiators considered viable 
were agency self-reporting, formal and informal consultations, and 
periodic review mechanisms.83  These approaches had been used 
successfully in other treaty contexts and were likely to garner support from 
leading competition authorities. 
As reported elsewhere, throughout the negotiations the question of 
review mechanisms was of central concern.84  But consistent throughout 
the process was the sense among many negotiators that self-reporting, 
consultations, and periodic assessments would facilitate compliance. 
In the final version of the CAP, the self-reporting provision requires 
participants to publish a Template highlighting important features of their 
 
Lund University), http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=8894473&file 
OId=8896966 [https://perma.cc/5KFX-93QM]. 
 79. See Open Skies Partnerships: Expanding the Benefits of Freer Commercial Aviation, 
BUREAU ECON. & BUS. AFFAIRS (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.state.gov/open-skies-partnerships 
-expanding-the-benefits-of-freer-commercial-aviation/ [https://perma.cc/FG25-4W44] (“Since 1992, 
the United States has established Open Skies with over 125 foreign partners.”); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
MODEL OPEN SKIES AGREEMENT arts. 13–14 (2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents 
/organization/114970.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y3H-8N45]. 
 80. See Treaties, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/treaties [https://perma.cc 
/NQB8-H4V2] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020) (noting that some treaties and agreements include 
provisions “confer[ring] jurisdiction on the Court” for issues of “application or interpretation”). 
 81. Delrahim & Alford, supra note 4, at 103–04.  
 82. Id. at 104.  
 83. Id.   
 84. See, e.g., id. at 107–08 (describing the long process of negotiating the adherence and review 
mechanisms for the second draft of the framework). 
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investigation and enforcement procedures that are relevant for the 
implementation of the framework.85  In essence, each participating 
competition authority is required to explain how it complies with each due 
process commitment, and identify any limitations that preclude 
compliance.  As of March 2020, over half of the signatories (forty-eight 
out of seventy-two competition authorities) had completed templates.86 
The second review mechanism is a periodic assessment of compliance 
by all participants to the framework.  These sessions will occur at least 
every four years at the ICN annual conference and review the 
implementation and functioning of the framework, advocate for the 
implementation of the due process norms, and make proposals to modify 
the principles.87  In order to avoid the possibility of “naming and shaming,” 
these assessments will “report on general trends, but will not identify 
individual Participants without consent.”88  Assuming the participants 
follow the Hague Adoption Convention’s approach to periodic 
assessments, one can expect that the reports will make specific 
recommendations for improvements, highlight concerns regarding 
instances of noncompliance, and affirm progress with respect to favorable 
compliance trends.89  This approach avoids naming and shaming specific 
countries, but promotes accountability for noncompliance. 
The final review mechanism used in the CAP includes a process of 
dialogue between the participants.  Participants agree to cooperate with 
one another in the implementation of the framework and are free to 
communicate directly with each other regarding issues of compliance.90  If 
a participant requests a formal dialogue, it can raise any issue of 
competition law procedure relevant to the framework.91  The relevant 
participants will engage in the confidential dialogue “in good faith, 
according full and sympathetic consideration to the issues raised”  in the 
dialogue.92  In essence, the CAP has incorporated a bilateral consultation 
process similar to what exists in competition chapters of free trade 
agreements, except that all such consultations shall be undertaken between 
 
 85. CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 3. 
 86. CAP Templates, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, https://www.internationalcompetition 
network.org/frameworks/competition-agency-procedures/cap-templates/ [https://perma.cc/G5VG 
-ZQH9] (last visited Mar. 31, 2020); ICN CAP Participants, supra note 2. 
 87. CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 3; Delrahim & Alford, supra note 4, at 116. 
 88. CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 3. 
 89. See generally Hague Special Commission Recommendations, supra note 75. 
 90. CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 2. 
 91. Id. at 2–3. 
 92. Id. at 3. 
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competition authorities rather than trade officials.93  Such consultations 
have proven successful in the trade context, with the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission recently announcing that it would modify its procedural rules 
in response to concerns raised in bilateral consultations with the United 
States.94 
In order to ensure effective compliance, the framework creates three 
co-chairs to essentially serve as the secretariat or registrar of the 
framework.95  The inaugural co-chairs of the framework are the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, the German Bundeskartellamt, 
and the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.96 
CONCLUSION 
Promoting international procedural norms in the competition law 
context is still in its early stages.  After over a decade of recommendations 
and guidelines encouraging best practices, the international competition 
community has finally taken a quantum leap with an agreement that 
obligates competition authorities to respect fundamental due process.  
Competition authorities are now promising one another to respect due 
process and submitting to a series of review mechanisms to help ensure 
such respect.  As Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim recently 
said, “The CAP is still in its early stage, but I have been greatly encouraged 
by the international reception of the agreement.  It has the potential to 
become one of the competition community’s most significant 
achievements in promoting due process.”97 
 
 93. See, e.g., United States – Korea Free Trade Agreement, supra note 68, art. 16.7.  This Free 
Trade Agreement provides for a bilateral consultation process: 
To foster understanding between the Parties, or to address specific matters that arise under 
this Chapter, each Party shall, on request of the other Party, enter into consultations 
regarding representations made by the other Party. . . .  The Party to which a request for 
consultations has been addressed shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to the 
concerns raised by the other Party.  To facilitate discussion of the matter that is the subject 
of the consultations, each Party shall endeavor to provide relevant non-confidential 
information to the other Party.  
Id. 
 94. Wooyoung Lee & Choi Hyung-jo, KFTC Plans to Revise Rules to Reflect Concerns with 
Competition Proceedings, Procedural Fairness, MLEX MARKET INSIGHT (Feb. 13, 2020, 8:05 PM). 
 95. CAP FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 2. 
 96. Press Release, Int’l Competition Network, Participants of the ICN Framework for 
Competition Agency Procedures Hold Inaugural Meeting (June 7, 2019), https://www.international 
competitionnetwork.org/news/icn-framework-for-competition-agency-procedures-update/ [https:// 
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 97. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., “With a Little 
Help From My Friends”: Using Principles of Comity to Protect International Antitrust Achievements 
13 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1201656/download [https://perma.cc 
/V66T-82FY].  
